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Timely maintenance is an important means of increasing system dependability and life span. Fault Maintenance trees
(FMTs) are an innovative framework incorporating both maintenance strategies and degradation models and serve as a good
planning platform for balancing total costs (operational and maintenance) with dependability of a system. In this work, we
apply the FMT formalism to a Smart Building application and propose a framework that eciently encodes the FMT into
Continuous Time Markov Chains. This allows us to obtain system dependability metrics such as system reliability and mean
time to failure, as well as costs of maintenance and failures over time, for dierent maintenance policies. We illustrate the
pertinence of our approach by evaluating various dependability metrics and maintenance strategies of a Heating, Ventilation
and Air-Conditioning system. 1
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet-of-things has enabled a new type of buildings, termed Smart Buildings, which aim to deliver useful
building services that are cost eective, reliable, ubiquitous and ensure occupant comfort and productivity (thermal
quality, air comfort). Smart buildings are equipped with many sensors such that a high level of intelligence is
achieved: light and heating can be switched on automatically; re and burglar alarms can be more sophisticated;
and cleaning services can be connected to the occupancy rate. Maintenance is a key element to keep smart
buildings smart: without proper maintenance (cleaning, replacements, etc.), the benets of achieving greater
eciency, comfort, increased building lifespan, reliability and sustainability are quickly lost.
In this paper, we consider an important element in smart buildings, namely the heating, ventilation and
air-conditioning (HVAC) system, responsible for maintaining thermal comfort and ensuring good air-quality in
buildings. One way of improving the lifespan and reliability of such systems is by employing methods to detect
1Parts of this paper have been published in the 4th ACM International Conference on Systems of Energy-Ecient Build Environments
(BuildSys 2017) [6].
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies
are not made or distributed for prot or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. To copy
otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specic permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from
permissions@acm.org.
© 2018 ACM. 1550-4859/2018/1-ART1 $15.00
DOI: 10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2018.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
6.
05
17
4v
2 
 [c
s.S
Y]
  2
2 J
un
 20
18
1:2 • N.Cauchi et al.
faults and to perform preventive and predictive maintenance actions. Techniques for fault detection and diagnosis
for Smart Building applications have been developed in [4, 25]. Predictive and preventive maintenance strategies
are devised in [3, 7, 21]. Moreover, a reliability-centered predictive maintenance policy is proposed in [28]. This
policy is for a continuously monitored system which is subject to degradation due to imperfect maintenance.
However, these techniques neglect reliability measurements and focus only on synthesis of maintenance policies
in the presence of degradation and faults. The current industrial standard for measuring a system’s reliability is
the use of Fault trees, where the focus is on nding the root causes of a system failure using a top-down approach
and do not incorporate degradation of system components and maintenance action [1, 20, 23]. [22] presents the
Fault Maintenance Tree (FMT) as a framework that allows to perform planning strategies for balancing total
costs and reliability and availability of the system. FMTs are an extension of FT encompassing both degradation
and maintenance models. The degradation models represent the dierent levels of component degradation and
are known as Extended Basic Events (EBE). The maintenance models incorporate the undertaken maintenance
policy which includes both inspections and repairs. These are modelled using Repair and Inspection modules in
the FMT framework.
In literature, analysis of FMTs is performed using Statistical Model checking (SMC) [22], which generates
sample executions of a stochastic system according to the distribution dened by the system and computes
statistical guarantees based on the executions [19]. In contrast, Probabilistic Model Checking (PMC) provides
formal guarantees with higher accuracy when compared with SMC [27], at a cost of being more memory intensive
and may result in a state space explosion. PMC is an automatic procedure for establishing if a desired property
holds in a probabilistic system model which encodes the probability of making a transition between states. This
allows for making quantitative statements about the system’s behaviour which are expressed as probabilities
or expectations [18]. Probabilistic model checking has been successfully applied in a dierent domains so far
including: aerospace and avionics [13], optical communication [24], systems biology [9] and robotics [10]. In this
paper we tackle the FMT analysis using PMC. Our contributions can be summarised as follows:
(1) We formalise the FMT using Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMCs) and the dependability metrics
of a Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) system, using the Continuous Stochastic Logic
(CSL) formalism, such that they can be computed using the PRISM model checker [17].
(2) To tackle the state space explosion problem, we present an FMT abstraction technique which decomposes
a large FMT into an equivalent abstract FMT based on a graph decomposition algorithm. This involves
an intermediate step where the large FMT is transformed into an equivalent direct acyclic graph and
decomposed into a set of small sub-graphs. Each of these small sub-graphs are converted to an equivalent
smaller CTMC and analysed separately to compute the required metric, while maintaining the original
FMT hierarchy. Using our framework, we are able to achieve a 67% reduction in the state space size.
(3) Finally, we construct a FMT that identies failure of an HVAC and illustrate the use of the developed
framework to construct and analyse the FMT. We also evaluate relevant performance metrics using
the PRISM model checker, compare dierent maintenance strategies and highlight the importance of
performing maintenance actions.
This article has the following structure: Section 2 introduces the heating, ventilation and air-conditioning
(HVAC) set-up under consideration together with the maintenance question we are addressing. This is followed
by Section 3, which presents the fault maintenance trees and probabilistic model checking frameworks. Next, we
present the developed methodology for modelling FMT using CTMCs and perform model checking in Section 4.
The framework is then applied to the HVAC system in Section 5.
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2 PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider the heating, ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC) system setup found within the Department of
Computer Science, at the University of Oxford. A graphical description is shown in Figure 1. It is composed of
two circuits - the air ow circuitry and the water circuit. The gas boiler heats up the supply water and transfers
the supply water into two sections - the supply air heating coils and the radiators. The rate of water owing in
the heating coil is controlled using a heating coil valve, while the rate of water ow in the radiator is controlled
using a separate valve. The outside air is mixed with the air extracted from the zone via the mixer. This is fed
into the heating coil, which warms up the input air to the desired supply air temperature. This air is supplied
back, at a rate controlled by the Air Handling unit (AHU) dampers, into the zone via the supply fan. The radiators
are directly connected to the water circuitry and transfer the heat from the water into the zone. The return water,
from both the heating coils and the radiators, is then passed through the collector and is returned back to the
boiler.
Fig. 1. High level schematic of an HVAC system.
The correct maintenance of this system is essential to ensure that the building operates with optimum eciency
while user comfort is maintained. The choice on the type of maintenance depends on several factors, including
the dierent costs of maintenance and failures, and the practical feasibility of performing maintenance. To this
end, we aim to address the following maintenance questions: (1) what is the optimal maintenance strategy that
minimises system failures?; (2) what is the best trade-o between cost of inspections, operation and maintenance,
vs the system’s number of expected failures?; (3) how frequently should the dierent maintenance actions such
as performing a cleaning or a replacement be performed?; and (4) what is the eect of employing maintenance
over a specic time horizon vs not performing maintenance?
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3 PRELIMINARIES
3.1 Fault trees
Fault trees (FT) are directed acyclic graphs (DAG) describing the combinations of component failures that lead to
system failures. It consists of two types of nodes: events and gates.
Denition 3.1 (Event). An event is an occurrence within the system, typically the failure of a subsystem down
to an individual component. Events can be divided into basic events (BEs) and intermediate events. BE occur
spontaneously and denote the component/system failures while intermediate events are caused by one of or more
other events. The event at the top of the tree, called the top event (TE), is the event being analysed, modeling the
failure of the (sub)system under consideration (both type of events are highlighted in Figure 2).
Denition 3.2 (Gates). The internal nodes of the graph are called gates and describe the dierent ways that
failures can interact to cause other components to fail i.e. how failures in subsystems can combine to cause a
system failure. Each gate has one output and one or more inputs. The gates in a FT can be of several types and
these include the AND gate, OR gate, k/N-gate [22]. The output of a gate triggers an event which shows how
failures propagate through the fault tree.
Figure 2 depicts a fault tree were the basic events are shown using circles, top and intermediate events are
depicted by a rectangle.
Fig. 2. Example of a FT with five basic events (1-5), two intermediate events (B1,B2) and top event A; failures are propagated
by the gates (G1 −G3).
3.2 Fault maintenance trees
Fault maintenance trees (FMT) extend fault trees by including maintenance (all the standard FT gates are also
employed by the FMTs). This is achieved by making use of:
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(1) Extended Basic Events (EBE) - The basic events are modied to incorporate degradation models of the
component the EBE represents. The degradation models represent dierent discrete levels of degradations
the components can be in and are a function of time. The timing diagram showing the progression
of degradation within an EBE is shown in Figure 3. The presented EBE had N discrete degradation
levels, initially the EBE is its new state and it gradually moves from one degradation levels, based on the
underlying distribution describing the degradation, to the next until the faulty level N is reached.
Fig. 3. Timing diagram of degradation within an EBE.
(2) Rate Dependency Events - A new gate, introduced in [22] and labelled as RDEP, accelerates the degradation
rates of n dependent child nodes and is depicted in Figure 4. When the component connected to the input
of the RDEP fails, the degradation rate of the dependent components is accelerated with an acceleration
factor γ . The corresponding timing diagram is shown in Figure 5. When the input signal is enabled
(input = 1), the child EBE moves to the next degradation levels at a faster rate.
RDEP
input
Children (n)
Fig. 4. RDEP gate with 1 input and dependent components also known as children.
(3) Repair and Inspection modules - The repair module (RM) performs cleaning or replacements actions.
These actions can be either carried out using xed time schedules or when enabled by the inspection
module (IM). The RM module performs periodic maintenance actions (clean or replace), independently of
the IM. The IM performs periodic inspections and when components fall below a certain degradation
threshold a maintenance action is initiated by the IM and performed by the RM (outside of the RM’s
periodic maintenance cycle). The IM and RM modules are depicted in Figure 6. The eect of performing
a maintenance cleaning or replacement action on the EBE is illustrated in Figure 7. When a cleaning
action is performed the EBE moves back to its previous degradation level, while when a replacement is
performed the EBE moves back to the initial level.
A visual rendering of an FMT is given in Figure 8. It is composed of ve EBEs located at the bottom of the tree,
one RDEP with one dependent child, three gates, one repair and inspection module and three events which show
the dierent fault stages.
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Fig. 5. Degradation level evolution of child EBE showing eect of RDEP on degradation rate. Note, when the input is equal
to 1 the curve representing the degradation rate to go from one degradation level to the next (e.g. going from degradation
level 2 to 3) is steeper vs previous degradation level transitions (e.g. going from 0 to 1 or 1 to 2).
‘
Fig. 6. High-level description of the inspection and repair modules. The repair module performs maintenance actions
periodically (clean or replace). The inspection module performs inspections periodically and when the degradation level of
an EBE reaches thresh level, it triggers the repair module to perform a maintenance action immediately.
Fig. 7. Degradation level progression of EBE for dierent maintenance actions.
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Fig. 8. Example of a fault maintenance tree.
3.3 Probabilistic model checking
Model checking [8] is a well-established formal verication technique used to verify the correctness of nite-state
systems. Given a formal model of the system to be veried in terms of labelled state transitions and the properties
to be veried in terms of temporal logic, the model checking algorithm exhaustively and automatically explores
all the possible states in a system to verify if the property is satisable or not. Probabilistic model checking
(PMC) deals with systems that exhibit stochastic behaviour and is based on the construction and analysis of a
probabilistic model of the system. We make use of CTMCs, having both transition and state labels, to perform
stochastic modelling. Properties are expressed in the form of Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) [16], a stochastic
variant of the well-known Computational Tree Logic (CTL) [8] which includes reward formulae. Note, a system
can be modelled using multiple CTMCs which represent dierent sub-components within the whole. Transition
labels are then used to synchronise the individual CTMCs representing dierent parts of a system and in turn
obtain the full CTMC representing the whole system.
Denition 3.3. The tuple C = (S, s0,TL,AP,L,R) denes a CTMC which is composed of a set of states S , the
initial state s0, a nite set of transition labels TL, a nite set of atomic propositions AP, a labelling function
L : S → 2AP and the transition rate matrix R : S × S → R≥0. The rate R(s, s ′) denes the delay before which a
transition between states s and s ′ takes place. If R(s, s ′) , 0 then the probability that a transition between the
states s and s ′ is dened as 1 − e−R(s,s ′)t where t is time. No transitions will trigger if R(s, s ′) = 0.
The logic of CSL species state-based properties for CTMCs, built out of propositional logic (with atoms
a ∈ AP) , a steady-state operator (S) that refers to the stationary probabilities, and a probabilistic operator (P) for
reasoning about transient state probabilities. The state formulas are interpreted over states of a CTMC, whereas
the path formulas are interpreted over paths in a CTMC. The syntax of CSL is:
Φ ::= true | a | Φ ∧ Φ | ¬Φ | S∼p [Φ] | P∼p [ϕ]
ψ ::= X ϕ | Φ U≥T Φ
where ∼∈ {<, ≤,=, ≥, >}, p ∈ [0, 1],T ∈ R≥0 is the time horizon, X is the next operator and U is the until operator.
The semantics of CSL formulas is given in [16]. S∼p [Φ] asserts that the steady-state probability for a Φ-state
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meets the bound ∼ p whereas P∼p [Φ U≤t Φ] asserts that with probability ∼ p, by the time t a state satisfying
Φ will be reached such that all preceding states satisfy Φ. Additional properties can be specied by adding the
notion of rewards. The extended CSL logic adds reward operators, a subset of which are [16]:
R∼r [C≤T ] | R∼r [F Φ]
where r , t ∈ R≤0 and Φ is a CSL formula. A state s satises R∼r [C≤T ] if, from state s, the expected reward
cumulated up until T time units have elapsed satises ∼ r and R∼r [F Φ] is true if, from state s , the expected
reward cumulated before a state satisfying Φ is reached meets the bound ∼ r .
Examples of a CSL property with its natural language translation are: (i) P≥0.95[F complete] - “The probability
of the system eventually completing its execution successfully is at least 0.95". Each state (and/or transition) of
the model is assigned a real-valued reward, allowing queries such as: (ii) R=?[F success] - “What is the expected
reward accumulated before the system successfully terminates?" Rewards can be used to specify a wide range of
measures of interest, for example, the total operational costs and the total percentage of time during which the
system is available.
4 FORMALIZING FMTS USING CTMCS
4.1 FMT Syntax
To formalise the syntax of FMTs using CTMCs, we rst dene the set F , characterizing each FMT element by
type, inputs and rates. We introduce a new element called DELAY which will be used to model the deterministic
time delays required by the extended basic events (EBE), repair module (RM) and inspection module (IM). We
restrict the set F to contain the EBE, RDEP gate, OR gate, DELAY, RM and IM modules since these will be the
components used in the case study presented in Section 5.
Denition 4.1. The set F= {EBE,RDEP ,OR,DELAY ,RM, IM} of FMT elements consists of the following tuples.
Here, n,N ∈ N are natural numbers, thresh, in, trig ∈ {0, 1} take binary values, Tcln , Trplc , Tr ep ,Toh , Tinsp ∈ R≥0
are deterministic delays, Tdeд ∈ R≥0 is a rate and γ ∈ R≥0 is a factor.
• (EBE,Tdeд ,Tcln ,Trplc ,N ) represent the extended basic events with N discrete degradation levels, each of
which degrade with a time delay equal toTdeд . It also takes as inputs the time taken to restore the EBE to
the previous degradation level Tcln when cleaning is performed and the time taken to restore the EBE to
its initial state Trplc following a replacement action.
• (RDEP ,n,γ , in,Tdeд) represents the RDEP gate with n dependent children, acceleration factor γ , the input
in which activates the gate and Tdeд the degradation rate of the dependent children.
• (OR,n) represents the OR gate with n inputs. When either one of the inputs reaches the state labelled
with f ailed , the OR gate returns a true signal.
• (RM,n,Tr ep ,Toh ,Tinsp ,Tcln ,Trplc , thresh, trig) represents the RM module which acts on n EBEs (in our
case, this corresponds to all the EBEs in the FMT). The RM can either be triggered periodically to perform
a cleaning action, everyTr ep delay, or a replacement action, everyToh delay, or by the IM when the delay
Tinsp has elapsed and the thresh condition is met. The time to perform a cleaning action isTcln , while the
time taken to perform a replacement is Trplc . The trig signal ensures that when the component is not in
the degraded states, no unnecessary maintenance actions are carried out.
• (IM,n,Tinsp ,Tcln ,Trplc , thresh) represents the IM module which acts on n EBEs (in our case, this corre-
sponds to all the EBEs in the FMT). The IM initiates a repair depending on the current state of the EBE.
Inspections are performed in a periodic manner, every Tinsp . If during an inspection, the current state of
the EBE does not correspond to the new or failed state (i.e. the degradation level of the inspected EBE is
below a certain threshold), the thresh signal is activated and is sent to the RM. Once a cleaning action is
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performed the IM moves back to the initial state with a delay equal to Tcln or Trplc depending on the
maintenance action performed.
• (DELAY ,T ,N ) represents the DELAY module which takes two inputs representing the deterministic
delay T ∈ {Tdeд , Tcln ,Trplc ,Tr ep ,Toh ,Tinsp } to be approximated using an Erlang distribution with N
states. This DELAY module can be extended by inclusion of a reset transition label, which when triggered
restarts the approximation of the deterministic delay before it has elapsed. The extended DELAY module
is referred to as (DELAY ,T ,N )ext .
The FMT is dened as a special type of directed acyclic graph G = (V ,E) where the vertices V represent the
gates and the events which represent an occurrence within the system, typically the failure of a subsystem
down to an individual component level, and the edges E which represent the connections between vertices. The
vertices V are labelled instances of elements in F i.e. V may contain multiple elements of the same component
obtained from the set Fwhich are identied by their common element label. Events can either represent the
EBEs or intermediate events which are caused by one or more other events. The event at the top of the FMT
is the top event (TE) and corresponds to the event being analysed - modelling the failure of the (sub)system
under consideration. The EBE are the leaves of the DAG. For G to be a well-formed FMT, we take the following
assumptions (i) vertices are composed of the OR, RDEP gates, (ii) there is only one top event, (iii) RDEP can only
be triggered by EBEs and (iv) RM and IM are not part of the DAG tree but are modelled separately This DAG
formulation allows us to propose a framework in Subsection 4.5 such that we can eciently perform probabilistic
model checking.
Denition 4.2. A fault maintenance tree is a directed acyclic graph G = (V ,E) composed of vertices V and
edges E.
4.2 Semantics of FMT elements
Next, we provide the semantics for each FMT element, which are composed using the syntax of CTMC (cf.
Denition 3.3). These elements are then instantiated based on the underlying FMT structure to form the
semantics of the whole FMT. We obtain the semantics of the whole FMT via synchronisation of transition
labels between the dierent CTMCs representing the individual FMT elements. This is further explained in
subsection 4.3.
DELAY. We dene the semantics for the (DELAY ,T ,N ) element using Figure 9 and describe the corresponding
CTMC using the set of states given by D = {d0,d1, . . . ,dN+1}, the initial state d0, the set of transitions labels
TL = {trigger, move}, the set of atomic propositions AP = {T }with L(d0) = · · · = L(dN ) = ∅, and L(dN+1) = {T }.
The rate matrix R becomes clear from Figure 9 and
Ri j =

µ i = 0 ∧ j = 1,
N
T ((i ≥ 1 ∨ i < N + 1) ∧ j = i + 1) ∨ (i = N + 1 ∧ j = 1),
0 otherwise,
(1)
with i representing the current state, j is the next state and µ is a xed large value corresponding to introducing
a negligible delay, which is used to trigger all the DELAY modules at the same time (cf. Denition 3.3). In
Figure 10 we dene the semantics of (DELAY ,T ,N )ext . This results in the CTMC described using the state space
D = {d0,d1, . . . ,dN+1}, the initial state d0, the set of transition labels TL = {trigger, move, reset}, the set of
atomic propositions AP = {T }, the labelling function L(d0) = L(d1) = · · · = L(dN ) = ∅, and L(dN+1) = {T } and
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the rate matrix R where
Ri j =

µ i = 0 ∧ j = 1,
1 (i ≥ 2 ∨ i < N + 1) ∧ j = 1,
N
T ((i ≥ 1 ∨ i < N + 1) ∧ j = i + 1) ∨ (i = N + 1 ∧ j = 1),
0 otherwise,
(2)
with i representing the current state and j is the next state. In both instances, the deterministic delays is
approximated using an Erlang distribution [12] and all DELAY modules are synchronised to start together using
the trigger transition label. The extended DELAY module have the transition labels reset which restarts the
Erlang distribution approximation whenever the guard condition is met at a rate of 1 × Rsync where Rsync is
the rate coming from the use of synchronisation with other modules causing the reset to occur ( as explained in
Subsection 4.3). This is required when a maintenance action is performed which restores the EBE’s state back to
the original state and thus restart the degradation process, before the degradation time has elapsed.
Remark 1. A random variable Z ∈ R+ has an Erlang distribution with k ∈ N stages and a rate λ ∈ R+,Z ∼
Erlanд(k, λ), if Z = Y1 + Y2 + . . .Yk where each Yi is exponentially distributed with rate λ. The cumulative density
function of the Erlang distribution is characterised using
f (t ;k, λ) = 1 −
k−1∑
n=0
1
n! exp(−λt)(λt)
n for t , λ ≥ 0, (3)
and for k = 1, the Erlang distribution simplies to the exponential distribution. In particular, the sequence Zk ∼
Erlanд(k, λk) converges to the deterministic value 1λ for large k . Thus, we can approximate a deterministic delay T
with a random variable Zk ∼ Erlanд(k, kT ) [5, 14]. Note, there is a trade-o between the accuracy and the resulting
blow-up in size of the CTMC model for larger values of k (a factor of k increase in the model size) [12]. In this work,
the Erlang distribution will be used to model the xed degradation rates, the maintenance and inspection signals.
This is a similar approach taken in [22] where degradation phases are approximated by an (k,λ)-Erlang distribution.
ExtendedBasic Events (EBE). The EBE are the leaves of the FMT and incorporate the component’s degradation
model. EBE are a function of the total number of degradation steps N considered. Figure 11 shows the semantics
of the (EBE,Tdeд ,Tcln ,Tr ep ,N = 3). The corresponding CTMC is described by the tuple ({s0, s1, s2, s3}, s0,TLEBE ,
APEBE ,LEBE ,REBE ) where s0 is the initial state ,
TLEBE = {degradei ∈{0, ...,N }, perform_clean, perform_replace},
the atomic propositions APEBE = {new, thresh, failed}, the labelling function L(s0) = {new}, L(s1) = L(s2) =
{thresh},L(s3) = { f ailed} and
REBE =

0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
 .
The deterministic time delays taken as inputs are modelled using three dierent DELAY modules:
(1) an extended DELAY module approximatingTdeд with the transition label move replaced with degradeN such
that synchronisation between the two CTMCs is performed (explained in Subsection 4.3). WhenTdeд has
elapsed the transition labelled with degradeN is triggered and the EBE moves to the next state at a rate 2
2This is a direct consequence of synchronisation and corresponds to R × REBE . Refer to Subsection 4.3
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d0
start
d1 d2 d3 . . . dN+1
trigger,µ
move,NT move,
N
T move,
N
T move,
N
T
move,NT
Fig. 9. CTMC representing DELAY with N states used to approximate a delay equal to T approximated using Erlanд(N , NT ).
The transition labels TL = {trigger, move} are shown on each of the transitions. The state labels are not shown and the
initial state of the CTMC is pointed to using an arrow labelled with start.
d0
start
d1 d2 d3 . . . dN+1
trigger ,µ
move ,NT move ,
N
T move ,
N
T move ,
N
T
reset,1
reset,1
reset,1
reset,1
Fig. 10. CTMC representing the extended DELAY with N states used to approximate a delay equal toT . Delay approximated
using Erlanд(N , NT ). The transition labels TL = {trigger, move, reset} are shown on each of the state transitions, while
the state labels are not shown.
s0
start
s1 s2 s3
degrade1, λ degrade2, λ degrade3, λ
perform_clean, 1perform_clean, 1
perform_clean, 1
perform_replace, 1
perform_replace, 1
perform_replace, 1
Fig. 11. CTMC representing the EBE with N = 3 with the transition labels TLEBE = {degradei ∈{1,2,3},
perform_clean, perform_replace} on each of the state transitions. For clarity, the state labels are not shown. The
deterministic delays contained represent the transition label that is triggered when the delay generated by the corresponding
DELAY module has elapsed. The degradation rate is equal to λ = NMTT F where MTTF is the components mean time to
failure.
equal to NTdeд × 1. The reset transition label and the corresponding transitions are replicated in extended
DELAY module and replaced with perform_clean and perform_replace. When the the previous state
(if cleaning action is carried out) or to the initial state (if replace action is performed).
(2) a DELAY module approximatingTcln with the transition label move replaced with perform_clean. When
Tcln has elapsed the transition with transition label perform_clean is triggered and the EBE moves to
the previous state at a rate equal to NTcln .
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(3) a DELAY module approximating Trplc with the transition label move replaced with perform_replace.
When Trplc has elapsed the transition label perform_replace is triggered and the EBE moves to the
initial state at a rate equal to NTrplc .
The transition labels perform_clean and perform_replace cannot be triggered at the same time and it is
assumed thatTcln , Trplc . This is a realistic assumption as only one maintenance action is performed at the same
time.
RDEP gate. The RDEP gate has static semantics and is used in combination with the semantics of its n
dependent EBEs. When triggered (input = 1), the associated EBE reaches the state labelled failed, the degradation
rate of the n dependent children is accelerated by a factor γ . We model the input signal using
input =
{
1 L(s) = failed,
0 otherwise,
(4)
where L(s) is the label of the current state of the associated EBE (cf. Figure 5). Similarly, we map the RDEP gate
function using
RA =
{
γTdeд1 , . . . ,γTdeдn input = 1,
Tdeд1 , . . . ,Tdeдn otherwise,
(5)
where Tdeдi , i ∈ 1, . . .n corresponds to the degradation rate of the n dependent children. 3
OR gate. The OR gate indicates a failure when either of its input nodes have failed and also does not have
semantics itself but is used in combination with the semantics of itsn dependent input events (EBEs or intermediate
events). We use
FAIL =
{
0 E1 = 1 ∧ · · · ∧ En = 1,
1 otherwise,
(6)
where Ei = 1, i ∈ 1 . . .n corresponds to when the n events (cf. Def. 3.1), connected to the OR gate, represent a
failure in the system. In the case of EBEs, E1 = 1 occurs when the EBE reaches the failed state .
Repair module (RM). Figure 12 shows the semantics of (RM,n, Tr ep ,Toh ,Tinsp , Tcln , Trplc , thresh, trig). The
CTMC is described using the state space {rm0, rm1}, the initial state rm0, the transition labels
TLRM = {inspect, check_clean, check_replace, trigger_clean, trigger_replace},
the atomic propositions AP = {maintenance}, the labelling function L(rm0) = {∅}, L(rm1) = {maintenance} and
with
RIM =
[
1 1
1 0
]
.
For brevity in Figure 12, we used the transition labels check_maintenance and trigger_maintenance. The
transition label check_maintenance and corresponding transitions are replicated and the transition labels
replaced by check_clean or check_replace to allow for both type of maintenance checks. Similarly, the
transition label trigger_maintenance and corresponding transitions are duplicated and the transition labels
replaced by trigger_clean or trigger_replace to allow the initiation of both type of maintenance actions to
be performed. Due to synchronisation, only one of the transitions may trigger at any time instance (as explained
in Subsection 4.3). The transition labels trigger_clean or trigger_replace correspond to the transition label
trigger within the DELAY module approximating the deterministic delays Tcln and Trplc respectively. The
3Note, this eectively results in changing the deterministic delay being modelled by the DELAY module to a new value if input = 1.
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deterministic delays which trigger inspect, check_clean or check_replace correspond to when the time
delays Tinsp ,Tr ep and Toh respectively, have elapsed. All these signals are generated using individual DELAY
modules with the move transition label for each module replaced using inspect, check_clean or check_replace
respectively. The thresh signal is modelled using
thresh =
{
1 L(sj,1) = thresh ∨ · · · ∨ L(sj,n) = thresh,
0 otherwise,
(7)
where L(sj,i ), j ∈ 0 . . .N , i ∈ 1 . . .n correspond to the label of the current state j of each of the n EBE. Similarly,
we model the trig signal using
trig =
{
1 L(sj,1) , new ∨ · · · ∨ L(sj,n) , new,
0 otherwise.
(8)
Both signals act as guards which when triggered determine which transition to perform (cf. Fig. 12).
rm0start rm1
inspect,thresh =0,1
check_maintenance, trig =0,1
check_maintenance, trig=1,1
inspect, thresh =1,1
trigger_maintenance,1
Fig. 12. CTMC representing the RM with TLRM = {inspect, check_maintenance, perform_maintenance} shown on the
state transitions. The guard condition trig = 0/1 or thresh = 0/1 must be satisfied for the corresponding transition to trigger
when it is activated via synchronisation with the transition label.
Inspection module (IM) . The semantics of the (IM,n,Tinsp , Tcln ,Trplc , thresh) is depicted in Figure 13. The
CTMC is dened using the tuple ({im0, im1}, im0,TLIM ,APIM ,LIM ,RIM ). Here,
TLIM = {inspect, perform_clean, perform_replace},
APIM = {∅}, with L(s0) = L(s1) = ∅ and
RIM =
[
1 1
1 0
]
.
The thresh signal corresponds to same signal used by the RM, given using (7). In Figure 13, for clarity, we use
the transition label perform_maintenance. This transition label and corresponding transitions are duplicated
and the transition labels are replaced by either perform_clean or perform_replace to allow for both type
of maintenance actions to be performed when one of them is triggered using synchronisation. The same
DELAY modules used in the RM and EBE to represent the deterministic delays are used by the IM. The DELAY
module used to represent the deterministic delays Tcln and Trplc triggers the transition labels perform_clean or
perform_replace. This represents that the maintenance action has completed.
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im0start im1
inspect, thresh =0,1
inspect, thresh =1,1
perform_maintenance ,1
Fig. 13. CTMC representing the IM with TLIM = {inspect, perform_maintenance} shown on the state transitions. The
guard condition trig = 0 and thresh = 1 must be satisfied for the corresponding transition to trigger when it is activated via
synchronisation with the transition label.
4.3 Semantics of composed FMT
Next, we show how to obtain the semantics of a FMT from the semantics of its elements using the FMT syntax
introduced in Subsection 4.1. We dene the DAG G by dening the vertices V and the corresponding events E.
The leaves of the DAG are the events corresponding to the EBE. The events E are connected to the vertices V ,
which trigger the corresponding auxiliary function used to represent the semantics of the gates. The Events
connected to the RM and IM are initiated by triggering the auxiliary functions thresh and trig given using (7)
and (8) respectively. Based on the structure of G, we compute the corresponding CTMC by applying parallel
composition of the individual CTMCs representing the elements of the FMT. The parallel composition formulae
are derived from [11] and dened as follows,
Denition 4.3 (Interleaving Synchronization). The interleaving synchronous product of C1 = (S1, s01, TL1,
AP1,L1,R1) and C2 = (S2, s02,TL2,AP2,L2,R2) is C1 | |C2 = (S1 × S2, (s01, s02),TL1 ∪ TL2,AP1 ∪ AP2,L1 ∪ L2,R)
where R is given by:
s1
α1,λ1−−−−→ s ′1
(s1, s2) α1,λ1−−−−→ (s ′1, s2)
, and
s2
α2,λ2−−−−→ s ′2
(s1, s2) α2,λ2−−−−→ (s1, s ′2)
,
and s1, s ′1 ∈ S1, α1 ∈ TL1, R1(s1, s ′1) = λ1, s2, s ′2 ∈ S2, α2 ∈ TL2, R2(s2, s ′2) = λ2.
Denition 4.4 (Full Synchronization). The full synchronous product of C1 = (S1, s01,TL1,AP1,L1,R1) and
C2 = (S2, s02,TL2,AP2,L2,R2) is C1 | |C2 = (S1 × S2, (s01, s02),TL1 ∪ TL2,AP1 ∪ AP2,L1 ∪ L2,R) where R is given
by:
s1
α,λ1−−−→ s ′1 and s2
α,λ2−−−→ s ′2
(s1, s2) α,λ1×λ2−−−−−−→ (s ′1, s ′2)
,
and s1, s ′1 ∈ S1, α ∈ TL1 ∧ TL2, R1(s1, s ′1) = λ1, s2, s ′2 ∈ S2, α2 ∈ TL2, R2(s2, s ′2) = λ2.
For any pair of states, synchronisation is performed either using interleaving or full synchronisation. For full
synchronisation, as in Denition 4.3, the rate of a synchronous transition is dened as the product of the rates for
each transition. The intended rate is specied in one transition and the rate of other transition(s) is specied as
one. For instance, the RM synchronises using full synchronisation with the DELAY modules representing Tinsp ,
Tr ep and Trplc and therefore, to perform synchronisation between the RM and the DELAY modules, the rates of
all the transitions of RM should have a value of one (cf. Fig. 12), while the rate of the DELAY modules represent
the actual rates (cf. Fig 9 and Fig 10). The same principle holds for the EBEs and the IM. We refer the reader to
Table 1 to further understand the synchronisation between the FMT components and the method employed for
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parallel composition. Consider a simple example showing the time signals and synchronisations required for
Component Synchronised with component Transition label Synchronisation method
DELAY representing Tdeд DELAY modules representing Tcln ,Trplc ,Tinsp trigger Full synchronisation
RM DELAY module representing Tr ep trigger_clean Full synchronisation
RM DELAY module representing Toh trigger_replace Full synchronisation
EBE DELAY representing Tdeд degradeN Full synchronisation
DELAY representing Tcln RM, EBE check_clean Full synchronisation
DELAY representing Trplc RM, EBE check_replace Full synchronisation
DELAY representing Tinsp RM, IM inspect Full synchronisation
DELAY representing Tr ep RM, IM, EBE perform_clean Full synchronisation
DELAY representing Toh RM, IM, EBE perform_replace Full synchronisation
EBE RM,IM, all DELAY modules, other EBEs - Interleaving synchronisation
Table 1. Performing synchronisation between the dierent FMT components and the synchronisation method used.
modelling an EBE and the RM and IM. The EBE has a degradation rate equal toTdeд and we limit the functionality
of the RM and IM by allowing only the maintenance action to perform cleaning. We also need the corresponding
DELAY modules generating the degradation rates, Tdeд and the maintenance rates Tcln ,Tinsp ,Tr ep . The resulting
CTMC is obtained by performing a parallel composition of the componentsCall = CEBE | | CTdeд | |CRM | |CIM | |CTcln
| |CTinsp | |CTr ep . The resulting state space is then Sall = SEBE × STdeд × SRM × SIM × STcln × STinsp × STr ep . The
synchronisation between the dierent components is shown in Figure 14 and proceeds as follows:
(1) All the DELAY modules (except Tcln ) start at the same time using the trigger transition label.
(2) When the extended DELAY module generating theTdeд time delay elapses, the corresponding EBE moves
to the next state through synchronisation with the transition label degradeN .
(3) The clock signals Tr ep ,Tinsp represent periodic maintenance and inspection actions and when the deter-
ministic delay is reached, through synchronisation with the transition label check_clean or the inspect,
the RM or IM modules are triggered (cf. Fig. 12 and 13). If RM triggers a maintenance action, the DELAY
representing Tcln is triggered using the synchronisation labels trigger_clean. Once the deterministic
delay Tcln elapses, the EBE, the extended DELAY module representing Tdeд (where the reset transition
label within the extended DELAY module is replaced with perform_clean) and the IM are reset using
the transition label perform_clean.
Remark 2. One should note that performing synchronisation results in a large state space, which is a function of
the number of states used to approximate the deterministic delays. In order to counteract this eect we propose an
abstraction framework in Subsection 4.5.
4.4 Metrics
We use PRISM to compute the metrics of the model described in Subsection 3.2. The metrics can be expressed
using the extended Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) as follows:
(1) Reliability : This can be expressed as the complement of the probability of failure over the time T ,
1 − P=?[F≤T f ailed].
(2) Availability: This can be expressed as R=?[C≤T ]/T , which corresponds to the cumulative reward of the
total time spent in states labelled with okay and thresh during the time T .
(3) Expected cost: This can be expressed using R=?[C≤T ], which corresponds to the cumulative reward of the
total costs (operational, maintenance and failure) within the time T .
(4) Expected number of failure: This can be expressed using R=?[C≤T ], which corresponds to the cumulative
transition reward that counts the number of times the top event enters the failed state within the time T .
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Fig. 14. Block diagram showing the synchronisation connections between one component and the other, together with the
corresponding transition label which triggers synchronisation.
4.5 Decomposition of FMTs
The use of CTMC and deterministic time delays results in a large state space for modelling the whole FMT (cf.
Remark 2). We therefore propose an approach that decomposes the large FMT into an equivalent abstract CTMC
that can be analysed using PRISM. The process involves two transformation steps. First we convert the FMT
into an equivalent directed acyclic graph (DAG) and split this graph into a set of smaller sub-graphs. Second, we
transform each sub-graph into an equivalent CTMC by making use of the developed FMT components semantics
(cf. Subsec. 4.2), and performing parallel composition of the individual FMT components based on the underlying
structure of the sub-graph. The smaller sub-graphs are then sequentially composed to generate the higher level
abstract FMT. Figure 15 depicts a high-level diagram of the decomposition procedure.
Fig. 15. Overall developed framework for decomposition of FMTs into the equivalent abstract CTMCs.
Conversion of the original FMT to the equivalent graph. The FMT is a DAG (cf. Subsection 4) and in this
framework we need to apply a transformation to the DAG in the presence of an RDEP gate, such that we can
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perform the decomposition. The RDEP causes an acceleration of events on dependent children nodes when the
input node fails. In order to capture this feature in a DAG, we need to duplicate the input node such that it is
connected directly to the RDEP vertex. This allows us to capture when the failure of the input occurs and the
corresponding acceleration of the the children. This is reasonable as the same RM and IM are used irrespective of
the underlying FMT structure.
Graph decomposition. We dene modules within the DAG as sub-trees composed of at least two events
which have no inputs from the rest of the tree and no outputs to the rest except from its output event [20]. We
can divide the graph into multiple partitions based on the number of modules making up the DAG. We dene the
following notations to ease the description of the algorithm:
• Vo indicates whether the node is the top node of the DAG.
• Vд indicates the node where the graph split is performed.
• Modules correspond to sub-graphs in DAG.
We set Vo when we construct the DAG from the FMT and then proceed with executing Algorithm 1. We rst
identify all the sub-graphs within the whole DAG and label all the top nodes of each sub-graph i as VT i . We loop
through each sub-graph and its immediate child (the sub-graph at the immediate lower level) and at the point
where the sub-graph and child are connected, the two graphs are split and a new node Vд is introduced. Thus,
executing Algorithm 1 results in a set of sub-graphs linked together by the labelled nodes Vд . For each of the
lower-level sub-graphs, we now proceed to compute the mean time to failure (MTTF). This will serve as an input
to the higher-level sub-graphs, such that metrics for the abstract equivalent CTMC can be computed.
ALGORITHM 1: DAG decomposition algorithm
input :DAG G = (V ,E)
output :Set of sub-graphs with one of the end nodes labelled as Vд .
1 Identify sub-graphs using ‘depth-rst’ traversal
2 Label all top nodes of each sub-graph i as VTi
3 forall select the top node of every sub-graph and the child dened at the immediate lower level do
4 if label VT already found in one of the leaf nodes of the sub-graph then
5 Split sub-graph
6 Insert new node Vд which will be used as input from connected sub-graph
7 end
8 end
PMC of sub-graphs. We start from the bottom level sub-graphs and perform the conversion to CTMC using
the formal models presented in Subsection 4.2. The formal models have been built into a library of PRISM modules
and based on the underlying components and structure making up the sub-graph, the corresponding individual
formal models are converted into the sub-graph’s equivalent CTMC by performing parallel composition (cf.
Subsec. 4.3). For each sub-graph, we compute the probability of failure De (T ) at time T , from which we calculate
the MTTF [23] using
MTTF =
ln(1 − De (T ))
−T .
The MTTF serves as the input to the higher level sub-graph at timeT . The new node in the higher-level sub-graph,
now degrades with the new time delay Tdeд = MTTF , which is fed into the corresponding DELAY component.
This process is repeated for all the dierent sub-graphs until the top level node Vo is reached. Figure 16 depicts
the steps needed to perform PMC for one of the sub-graphs.
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Fig. 16. PMC of sub-graphs.
PMC of nal equivalent abstract CTMC. On reaching the top level nodeVo , we compute the metrics for the
equivalent abstract CTMC for a specic time horizonT . For dierent horizons, the previous step of computing the
MTTF for the underlying lower level sub-graphs needs to be repeated. Using this technique, we can formally verify
larger FMTs, while using less memory and computational time due to the signicantly smaller state space of the
underlying CTMCs. Next, we proceed with an illustrative example comparing the process of directly modelling
Fig. 17. The original FMT and the abstract FMT corresponding to the equivalent abstract CTMC generated by the developed
framework. The MTTF for the F’ is computed based on the probability of failure of the heating coil.
the large FMT using CTMCs versus the de-compositional modelling procedure. Figure 17 presents the FMT
composed of two modules and the corresponding abstracted FMT. The abstract FMT is a pictorial representation of
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the model represented by the equivalent abstract CTMC obtained using the developed decomposition framework
(cf. Fig. 15). For both the large FMT and the equivalent abstract FMT a comparison between the total number of
states for the resulting CTMC models, the total time to compute the reliability metric and the resulting reliability
metric is performed. All computations are run on an 2.3 GHz Intel Core i5 processor with 8 GB of RAM and
the resulting statistics are listed in Table 2. The original FMT has a state space with 193543 states, while the
equivalent abstract CTMC has a state space with 63937 states. This corresponds to a 67% reduction in the state
space size. The total time to compute the reliability metric is a function of the nal time horizon and a maximal
73% reduction in computation time is achieved. Accuracy in the reliability metric of the abstract model is a
function of the time horizon and the number of states used to approximate the deterministic delay representing
the computed MTTF. The larger the number of states the more accurate the representation of the MTTF, but this
comes at a cost on the size of the underlying CTMC model. In our case, N = 4 is chosen. The accuracy of the
reliability metric computed by the abstract FMT results in a maximal reduction of 0.61%.
Time Original FMT Abstracted FMT
Horizon Time to compute Reliability Time to compute Total Reliability
metric MTTF metric Time
(years) (mins) (mins) (mins) (mins)
5 0.727 0.9842 0.142 0.181 0.223 0.9842
10 1.406 0.8761 0.219 0.309 0.528 0.8769
15 2.489 0.3290 0.292 0.622 0.914 0.3270
Table 2. Comparison between the original large FMT and the abstracted FMT.
5 CASE STUDY
We apply the FMT framework to a Heating, Ventilation and Air-conditioning (HVAC) system used to regulate a
building’s internal environment (cf. Sec. 2). Based on this HVAC system we construct the corresponding FMT
shown in Figure 18. The FMT structure follows the structure of the underlying HVAC system, as can be seen from
the colour shading used in Figure 18. The leaves of the tree are EBE with discrete degradation rates computed
using Table 3, approximated by the Erlang distribution where N is the number of degradation phases (k = N for
the Erlang distribution) and MTTF is the expected time to failure with MTTF = 1/λ (cf. Remark 1). We choose
an acceleration factor γ = 2 for the RDEP gate. The system is periodically cleaned every Tr ep months and a
major overhaul with a complete replacement of all components is carried out once every Toh years. Inspections
are performed every Tinsp months and return the components back to the previous state, corresponding to a
cleaning action. The total time to perform a cleaning action is 1 day (Tcln = 1 day), while performing a total
replacement of components takes 7 days (Trplc = 7 days). The time timing signals {Tr ep ,Toh ,Tinsp ,Tcln ,Trplc } are
all approximated using the Erlang distribution with N = 3. All maintenance actions are performed simultaneously
on all components.
5.1 antitative results
In the following subsections, we employ the developed framework (cf. Subsec. 4.5) to the FMT representing the
failure of the HVAC system (cf. Fig. 18) and perform three dierent experiments. We rst demonstrate the use of
the developed framework by converting the FMT for the HVAC set-up into an abstract CTMC.For this abstract
CTMC we compute the metrics (cf. Sec. 4.4) using probabilistic model checking to show the type of analysis that
can be performed using the set-up. Next, we perform a comparison between dierent maintenance strategies
applied to the same FMT. This allows the user to deduce the optimal strategy for the set-up. Last, we construct a
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Fig. 18. FMT for failure in HVAC system with leaves represented using EBE (associated RM and IM not shown in figure). The
EBE are labelled to correspond to the component failure they represent using the fault index presented in Table 3. The EBE
and intermediate events are colour coded such that they correspond to the dierent HVAC components thus showing how
the propagation of faults in the HVAC is reflected within the FMT.
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Fault Index Failure Mode N MTTF
(years)
1 Broken AHU Damper 4 20
2 Fan motor failure 3 35
3 Obstructed supply fan 4 31
4 Fan bearing failure 6 17
5 Radiator failure 4 25
6 Radiator stuck valve 2 10
7 Heater stuck valve 2 10
8 Failure in heat pump 4 20
Table 3. Extended Basic events in FMT with associated degradation rates (N, MTTF) obtained from [2, 15].
FMT which does not employ the repair and inspection module and compare it with the original FMT (includes
the maintenance modules) to further highlight the advantage of incorporating maintenance.
Applying the framework to HVAC set-up. We convert the FMT representing the failure of the HVAC
system into the equivalent abstract CTMC and perform probabilistic model checking over six time horizons
Nr = {0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25} years with the maintenance policy consisting of periodic cleaning every Tr ep = 2 years
and inspections every Tinsp = 1 year. No replacement actions are considered. For this set-up, all the metrics
corresponding to the reliability, availability, total costs (maintenance, inspection and operational costs) and the
total expected number of failures of the HVAC systems over the time horizon are computed and are shown in
Figure 19. The total maintenance cost to perform a clean is 100 [GBP], while an inspection cost 50 [GBP]. The
maximal time taken to compute a metric using the abstract FMT is 1.47 minutes. It is deduced that the reliability
reduces over time. The availability is seen to be nearly constant, while the expected number of failures increases
until it reaches a steady state value. This shows that there is a saturation in the number of maintenance actions
which one can perform before the system no longer achieves higher performance in reliability and availability.
One can further note that, as expected, the maintenance costs increases linearly with time.
Comparison between dierent maintenance strategies. In this second experiment, we compare all the
metrics (reliability, availability, total costs and expected number of failures) over the time horizon Nr =
{0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25} years when considering dierent maintenance strategies, such that we can identify the
optimal maintenance strategy that minimises cost and achieves the best trade-o in HVAC performance (i.e. with
minimal expected number of failures and high reliability and availability). We consider ve dierent maintenance
strategies which are listed in Table 4.
Strategy index Tr ep Toh Tinsp
M0 2 years - 1 year
M1 5 years - 2 years
M2 2 years 5 years -
M3 2 years 10 years 1 year
M4 2 years 20 years 6 months
Table 4. Implemented maintenance strategies.
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Fig. 19. Reliability, availability, total costs and expected number of failures of HVAC over time horizon Nr =
{0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25}.
We select strategies that have a dierent combination of repair, inspection and replacement strategies to
highlight the eect the dierent maintenance actions have on the HVAC system’s performance. Figure 20 depicts
the resulting metrics for the employed strategies.
We can deduce that the worst performing strategy is when cleaning actions are carried out every 5 years with
inspection carried out bi-annually and no replacements (corresponding to strategy M1). Strategies M2 and M3
have comparable high performance but with a signicant increase in the total costs due to the replacement action.
We witness the highest costs using strategy M2 due to the frequent replacement of the HVAC system. Comparing
strategiesM3 andM4 we can note thatM3 has fewer number of failures over the whole time horizon but this comes
with higher total costs due to the replacements. Strategies M0 and M4 have similar performance with M0 having a
slightly lower availability and higher expected number of failures but with comparable maintenance costs. From
this analysis, we can deduce that the optimal strategy which gives the best trade-o between costs and HVAC
system’s performance is strategy M0 (i.e. with annual inspections, bi-annual cleaning and no replacements).
Comparison between performingmaintenance andnomaintenance. Lastly, we compare the performance
of the HVAC system without performing any maintenance actions vs the HVAC system with annual inspections,
bi-annual cleaning and a major overhaul after 10 years. We employ the developed framework to represent the
FMT of the HVAC system, rst without incorporating the repair and inspection modules and then incorporating
the repair and inspection modules with Tinsp = 1 year, Tr ep = 2 years and Toh = 10 years. The obtained results,
depicted in Figure 21, highlight the importance of maintenance and how appropriate maintenance strategies
are required in order to maintain a reliable and available HVAC. When no maintenance is performed, both the
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Fig. 20. Comparison between dierent number of maintenance strategies for an HVAC systems.
reliability and availability of the HVAC system are gradually reduced, while the expected number of failures
increases, as the components are degrading with time. This is in contrast to when maintenance is performed
where high performance values of reliability and availability are achieved and the expected number of failures
are low, throughout the whole time horizon. One should note, that this comes at a price, where the total costs
increase when maintenance is applied. Consequently, this further highlights the need to perform an analysis to
deduce the optimal maintenance strategy which gives the best trade-o between costs, reliability, availability and
the expected number of failures.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
The paper presents a methodology for applying probabilistic model checking to FMTs. We model FMTs using
CTMCs which simplify the transformation of FMT into formal models that can be analysed using PRISM. We
further present a novel technique for abstracting the equivalent CTMC model. The novel decomposition procedure
tackles the issue of state space explosion and results in a signicant reduction in both the state space size and
the total time required to compute metrics. The framework is applied to an HVAC system and a set of dierent
experiments to demonstrate the use of the developed framework and to highlight (i) the importance of performing
maintenance and (ii) the eect of applying dierent maintenance strategies has been presented. The presented
framework can be further enhanced by adding more gates to the PRISM modules library which include the
Priority-AND, INHIBIT, k/N gates and to incorporate lumping of states as in [26].
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Fig. 21. Comparison between incorporating the maintenance modules vs performing no maintenance.
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